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Summary 
In 1997, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs commenced an Inquiry into Indigenous Business. However, after a 
Commonwealth election held late in 1998, the government decided not to continue the Inquiry 
and its investigations have not been published. This paper summarises some of the evidence 
given to the Inquiry to see if this increases our understanding of indigenous businesses. 
The evidence provides additional information on issues about which we are already aware. 
For example, there appears to be a continuing desire to clarify social and commercial goals within 
indigenous businesses. There is also some interest in establishing businesses that are owned by 
individuals and families rather than just communities, and in the strategy of joint venturing. A 
number of access issues were also raised during the Inquiry such as the ability to raise capital 
from inalienable land and some of the limits of the existing government structures. 
However, most of the data supplied to the inquiry were from bureaucracies and much of it 
related to their programs rather than to the enterprises themselves. Very few submissions were 
from indigenous people in business and the data tell us almost nothing about such issues as 
their aims, their problems, or the size of their ventures (for example, the number of employees or 
turnover). Despite the fact that other data indicate the majority of self-employed indigenous 
people are in major urban centres (capital cities), the Inquiry collected no data from these areas. 
Also absent were submissions from any of the mainstream banks. Therefore, the majority of the 
evidence to the Inquiry does not add a great deal to our knowledge about the nature of indigenous 
businesses nor does it introduce many new issues or insights. 
However, evidence to the Inquiry did raise the possibility of increasing access for indigenous 
people through micro-credit and credit union arrangements and one submission proposed that 
aspiring business people could be mentored through the facility of business incubators. These 
proposals may warrant further investigation. 
The Inquiry has revealed that other data may be available that has not yet been analysed. 
For example, the Western Australian Department of Commerce and Industry has indicated that it 
has records on some 1,000 indigenous businesses. Both this Department and the Aboriginal and 
the Torres Strait Islander Commission have suggested that some of the business people with 
whom they have contact may be willing to be interviewed. It would seem worthwhile exploring 
these new data sources in the future. 
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Introduction 
I do not think it is unrealistic to expect that in Western Australia within five years we might see 
2,500 jobs created within Aboriginal businesses (Department of Commerce and Trade (Western 
Australia) (DCTWA) 1998a: 250). 
The above prediction for Western Australia is possibly a little ambitious as census data show that 
nationally only 2,528 indigenous people were either self-employed or were employers in 1996. 
Nonetheless, businesses have, and can, play an important part in indigenous socioeconomic 
outcomes. Recent research on indigenous businesses have included the following: Daly (1993, 
1995) on the indigenous self-employed; Dana (1996) on indigenous women in business; Arthur 
(1996) on the role and strategies of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commercial 
Development Corporation (CDC)1 and on indigenous entrepreneurs; and Herron (1998) on the 
possibility of replacing the present Commonwealth Government’s arrangements for stimulating 
indigenous businesses with a new authority to be called Indigenous Business Australia (IBA). 
These pieces of work have provided information on a number of issues: the characteristics of the 
self-employed and the industries they are likely to be in (Daly 1993, 1995); the role of indigenous 
entrepreneurs, whether businesses should be owned by families, individuals or communities, the 
merits of joint venturing and whether social and commercial goals should be more clearly 
distinguished within businesses (Arthur 1996; Altman 1998; Herron 1998); and the availability of 
capital for small businesses (Dana 1996). 
In 1997, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs (the Committee) commenced an Inquiry (the Inquiry) into Indigenous Business, 
the terms of reference of which were as follows: 
The Committee shall inquire into and report on the existing opportunities and arrangements for 
encouraging sound Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander economic initiatives at the small and 
medium business level. In particular, the Committee will focus on: 
• The success of existing Commonwealth programs that help Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people (including those in joint ventures with non indigenous people) to acquire, 
control and develop sustainable commercial opportunities; 
• possible future policy directions and administrative arrangements at the Commonwealth 
level to encourage indigenous commercial initiatives; 
• any barriers to the establishment, acquisition or development of indigenous businesses, or 
businesses in which indigenous people are joint venture partners; and 
• means of raising the profile of indigenous controlled businesses, or businesses in which 
indigenous people are joint venture partners. 
The Committee shall also consider State, Territory, corporate and international examples of 
good practice in encouraging sound indigenous economic initiatives at the small and medium 
business level. 
The Inquiry received written submissions and held hearings during its investigations and 
these are listed in Appendix A. However, after a Commonwealth election late in 1998 the 
government decided to discontinue the Inquiry and its investigations were not published. Rather 
than lose the information contained in the submissions and hearings this paper looks at these to 
see if they shed any new light on issues relating to indigenous businesses. 
The data 
The Inquiry received 44 written submissions and held 28 hearings. Submissions were from 
several Commonwealth government departments and from the State governments of Queensland, 
Northern Territory and Western Australia. The governments of Tasmania and the Australian 
Capital Territory provided no information. The submissions that provided most hard data were 
from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) the Torres Strait Regional 
Authority (TSRA)2 and the CDC. However, these data, which are discussed below, referred largely 
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to the agencies’ programs and expenditures and provided little information about indigenous 
businesses themselves. 
Hearings were held with some of the government and industry bodies that provided 
submissions. The Inquiry also gathered information from non-government indigenous 
organisations, indigenous communities and individuals at hearings in several locations (see 
Appendix A). However, these locations were all in remote areas such as Nhulunbuy, Torres Strait, 
and the Kimberley and no information was gathered about indigenous businesses in urban areas. 
This is despite the fact that it has already been shown that, on a per capita basis, indigenous 
people who are either self-employed or employers are more likely to be located in capital cities 
(see ABS/CAEPR 1996: 19, 20). This distribution is reflected to a degree in recent data provided 
by the New South Wales Department of State and Regional Development (NSWDSRD)3 which 
indicate that of 300 indigenous businesses on their records, 85 per cent are located within an arc 
from Sydney north along the coast—west through New England and the area around Dubbo and 
Walgett, and that 25 per cent of businesses are in the greater Sydney district alone. Therefore, by 
taking what appears to have been a remote area focus, the Inquiry failed to collect information 
from locations where many indigenous businesses are located, namely major urban centres. 
A further point regarding the data is that the Inquiry took information from the two premier 
Commonwealth indigenous agencies: ATSIC and the TSRA and it conducted several hearings in 
Torres Strait. However, indigenous people in Torres Strait (6,064 persons) are only around two per 
cent of the total national indigenous population of 352,970. Therefore it can be argued the 
Inquiry’s procedure has tended to over-represent the views of indigenous people in Torres Strait 
and this may be reflected in this paper. 
Industries and indigenous businesses 
ATSIC provided data to the Inquiry about the business loans that have been made from the 1970s 
including an estimate of industries within which these businesses would be located, loan 
applications made over 1997–98 and a brief description of the type of business involved. 
Table 1. Industry of indigenous self-employment from 1996 Census, applications to 
ATSIC in 1997–98 and business loans made since the 1970s 
Industry  
Censusa 
1996 
Per cent 
ATSIC loan 
applicationsb 
1997–98 
Per cent 
 
Loans made 
1970s–1998 
Per cent 
Agriculture/forest/fishing 10 18 18 
Mining 1 2 0.2 
Manufacturing 5 7 7 
Electricity, gas, water 0.2 0.1 0 
Construction 13 9 22 
Wholesale 3 3 2 
Retail trade 12 15 22 
Accommodation, cafes, restaurants 3 7 0 
Transport and storage 4 6 8 
Communication services 1 0.5 0 
Finance and insurance 0.3 0 0 
Property and business 8 7 18 
Govt. admin. and defence 5 0 0 
Education 3 0.8 0 
Health and community services 8 1 0 
Cultural, recreation, personal 3 16 4 
Personal services 5 4 0 
Non classifiable 3 3 0.5 
Not stated 13 0.8 0 
Total 100 100 100 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 177 3 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Number 2528 583 1457 
Notes: a. Refers to those who identified as employers or self-employed. 
 b. From the Commonwealth indigenous agencies including ATSIC but excluding the CDC. 
Sources: 1996 Census; ATSIC (1998a: 197, 1998d); supplementary data provided by DCTWA. 
These data are compared in Table 1 with data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ 
(ABS) 1996 Census of the indigenous self-employed and employers and their industry of 
employment. The industry distributions from the three sources are similar and indicate that 
significant proportions of indigenous businesses are concentrated within three industry areas: 
agriculture, construction, and the retail sector. However there are two anomalies in Table 1: in 
the ‘property and business’ and the ‘culture and personal services’ industries, a higher proportion 
of people either apply for or receive loans, than actually operate businesses. These anomalies may 
be due to difficulties in accurately allocating the ATSIC data to the appropriate ABS industry. 
However, given that the ‘culture and personal services’ industry may be one in which indigenous 
people could enjoy a competitive advantage (Stanley 1983), the differences here may warrant 
further investigation.4 
Data provided to the Inquiry by the TSRA show that 71 per cent of all of its loans were to 
people wishing to establish or develop businesses in the fishing industry. This indicates the 
predominance and importance of this industry in the region and the relative ease with which 
people can access it (see below and Arthur 1990a; 1991).5 The TSRA data also indicate that, as 
elsewhere in Australia, a significant proportion of indigenous people in Torres Strait (12 per cent) 
appear interested in establishing businesses in the retail sector (TSRA 1998b: 135). 
The unit of business ownership 
An issue highlighted by earlier research is whether policies should seek to stimulate businesses 
depending on whether they are owned and run by families, individuals, communities, or are joint 
ventures between indigenous and non-indigenous operators. The evidence to the Inquiry provided 
some information on this issue. The Western Australian Government and the TSRA indicated that 
the majority of their clients were indigenous families or individuals interested in establishing 
small businesses (DCTWA 1998a: 250; TSRA 1998b: 135). An ATSIC Commissioner suggested to 
the Inquiry that these businesses have a better chance of success than do those that are 
community-owned. He argued that people involved in community-owned businesses may feel that 
they have little to lose or gain financially from the business’s success or failure, whereas 
individuals are more likely to strive to make their own business a success because they know that 
they will reap the rewards for themselves and they will be held responsible for any failure (ATSIC 
1998b: 51). In addition, the Commissioner suggested that communities may not present an 
environment that is conducive to operating a commercial business because communities are 
subject to social and internal conflicts (ATSIC 1998b: 52). On the other hand, it was noted that 
communities could draw on forms of support for their businesses that may not be so easily 
available to individuals and families. For example, they may utilise the Community Development 
Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme to subsidise the labour needs of their enterprises (TSRA 
1998b: 133; see Smith 1994; 1995; 1996 for examples of this).6 Further, community land is also 
often held collectively and, as noted below, this can make it difficult for businesses on that land 
to be owned by individuals. Given that discrete indigenous communities are mostly located in 
remote areas, both ATSIC and the CDC proposed to the Inquiry that an emphasis might be given 
to individual and family businesses in cities and to community-owned enterprises in remote areas 
(ATSIC 1998c: 6; CDC 1998a: 35).  
The Inquiry was provided with evidence of other forms of individual business. The Arnhem 
Land Progress Association (ALPA),7 which runs a number of community-based stores across the 
Northern Territory, described a particular type of small business there. ALPA noted that the 
aspiring business person might purchase a refrigerator, a freezer or a microwave oven, purchase 
goods from ALPA’s own store, and set up a small takeaway outlet on the veranda of their house. 
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They compete with ALPA by operating after normal store hours (ALPA 1998: 149). This is similar 
to the type of small trader activity noted in the Outer Islands of Torres Strait where people may 
buy some small-goods from their island store and resell these from their homes at a few cents 
over the store’s normal price. Like the people in the Northern Territory, these individual ‘petty 
traders’ also make a niche for themselves by opening in the evenings and at week-ends (Arthur 
1990a: 33, 1991, 1992; Scott 1990: 393).8 
Ownership and success 
Whether policy should focus on individual, family or community-owned businesses might be 
influenced by which are the most successful, however there is no commonly accepted measure of 
success in indigenous business in Australia. The evidence to the Inquiry suggests that ATSIC and 
the TSRA view success in terms of whether borrowers repay their loans, which is much the same 
as the approach taken by mainstream banks (ATSIC 1998b: 56).9 
The commercial fishing industry appears to afford a niche for successful individual small 
businesses.10 For example, one Torres Strait Islander with a commercial pilot’s license has leased 
a small plane to transport live crayfish to Cairns for export and has already successfully serviced 
two loans from the TSRA (Taika 1998: 2). The TSRA cites other examples of operators in the 
fishing industry who have been able to pay off their loans (TSRA 1998a: 2). Indeed, the TSRA 
stated that of 60 loans provided to people in two years only two were defaulted on. This reflects 
similar earlier findings which showed that in Torres Strait 98 per cent of individual indigenous 
business loans from the local bank were repaid successfully (Arthur 1990a: 137). This could 
suggest that individual businesses might be more successful than community businesses. 
However, Torres Strait is probably a unique situation for indigenous small business. Sections of 
the commercial fishing industry are relatively easy to access at a small scale, and high profits can 
be realised (Arthur 1991). For example, one fisher giving evidence to the Inquiry noted that a good 
cray fisher could earn $4,000 per day (Bowie 1998). However, these earnings seem extremely high 
and may not take into account climatic and seasonal variations (see Arthur 1990a). Other than 
the above, the Inquiry revealed little which would allow us to compare the success or merits of 
individual, family or community-owned businesses, although ATSIC data suggest that 
communities are able to make loan repayments at a slightly higher rate than individuals (87 
versus 77 per cent).11 
Joint ventures 
In recent years some attention has been given to the merits of joint indigenous/non-indigenous 
business ventures (see O’Faircheallaigh 1995; Arthur 1996; Herron 1998). Generally, such joint 
ventures are between companies and community groups or incorporated organisations and are 
large projects; the CDC, whose major strategy is joint venturing, deals with loans of $0.5 million 
upwards (CDC 1998a: 36; DCTWA 1998a: 250). Much of the evidence to the Inquiry relating to 
joint venturing came from large mining companies. For example, the Henry Walker Group 
indicated they are, or have been, involved in four joint ventures with indigenous groups (Henry 
Walker 1998). Another mining company, Rio Tinto, indicated that joint venturing was their 
favoured strategy and that their mines have stimulated between 28 and 35 indigenous enterprises 
(though not necessarily joint ventures and sometimes with CDEP assistance) with varying degrees 
of success (Rio Tinto 1998a, 1998b: 196). However, although the Inquiry revealed some interest in 
joint ventures, especially from these larger companies, too little detail was provided to make any 
assessment of the success or merits of the strategy. 
Evidence to the Inquiry also revealed that some indigenous people are interested in joint 
venturing with non-indigenous operators. For example, the Marngarr Community in the Northern 
Territory stated its wish to form a fishing joint venture with a Taiwanese company (Marngarr 
Community 1998: 2) and the TSRA plans to establish joint ventures for the construction of 
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infrastructure on the Outer Islands of Torres Strait (TSRA 1998a: 4, 1998b: 136).12 The Inquiry 
met with the indigenous directors of a joint venture formed in 1989 to purchase and operate a 
hotel, caravan park and supermarket complex in Fitzroy Crossing, Western Australia. This project 
was established under a loan of $1 million from the then Aboriginal Development Commission 
and the Inquiry was told that 
this venture would have to be one of the most successful to have been set up through the 
Aboriginal Development Commission … every monthly payment on the loan, including the loan 
for the supermarket, has been made on time (Leedal Pty Ltd 1998: 8). 
As part of the project, the local adult education centre trained workers for the hotel and the 
supermarket (Leedal Pty Ltd 1998). However, the success rate for local employment in the venture 
was described as very low. Young people were reluctant to work in the supermarket where they 
could be observed by non-indigenous customers, and in some cases they preferred to return to 
work in their own community stores after their training (Leedal Pty Ltd 1998). This reflects an 
earlier observation that some people are reluctant to work in jobs in the tourist industry which 
might involve face-to-face contact with non-indigenous people (see Altman 1988). Indigenous 
employees in the Fitzroy Crossing hotel faced the complicating factor that as they were its ‘half-
owners’ there was the strong possibility of them being distracted by patrons who were their 
relatives (Leedal 1998).13  
Social and commercial goals 
In response to questions from the Committee, the Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC)14 the CDC 
and ALPA all indicated that they experience problems when social and commercial goals are 
mixed within the indigenous businesses that they have dealings with and that, although both are 
important, they should be more clearly separated.15 For example the ILC stated: 
We say that we need to separate out the social, cultural and environmental side of the ILC from 
the commercial side … But what has to be remembered is that you have a block where people 
live and their social and cultural needs have to be addressed along with the commercial (ILC 
1998: 215). 
The ILC proposes to make this separation by establishing a purely ‘commercial arm’ within its 
structure (ILC 1998: 211). Similarly the CDC stated: 
The Commonwealth’s commercially orientated programs for indigenous people should be 
administered by the one organisation to enable more effective and efficient program delivery … 
these programs should be separated from socially oriented programs as much as possible so 
that program objectives are not confused and program outcomes consequently placed in 
jeopardy (CDC 1998a: 31). 
However, the CDC confirmed that although its primary aim was the commercial viability of any 
businesses, it was also conscious of furthering social goals, such as generating employment (CDC 
1998a: 38, 1998b: 102). For instance, when asked by the Committee if it saw its mission as 
maximising employment opportunities and careers for indigenous people, the chair of the CDC 
responded: 
That is the understanding. But the previous board had other policies and I think their policy 
was that they were more into wealth creation than job creation (CDC 1998a: 35). 
On the other hand, it was acknowledged this social goal would be tempered by the overall aim to 
act commercially (CDC 1998b: 109, 112). The CDC also referred to the fact that a significant 
aspect of its operations are its Community Service Obligations (CSOs) which involve mentoring 
new businesses. These CSOs are considered important by the CDC but are arguably a 
developmental or social element of its operations (Arthur 1996). Therefore, although the CDC 
advocates separating social and commercial goals, it actually pursues both. 
The ALPA also indicated to the Inquiry that their aim is not simply to maximise profits but 
also to pursue social goals. To this end ALPA carries out cross-subsidisation by, for example, 
increasing the price of cigarettes to subsidise the cost of importing vegetables. The ALPA also 
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spends some of its business income on community projects such as community airstrips, youth 
grants, education grants, and grants for traditional ceremonies (ALPA 1998: 138–142).16 
At one stage of the Inquiry the Committee’s Chair noted ‘The balance between social and 
economic is a very important part of this whole issue’ (see APLA 1998: 142). The above comments 
suggest that those operating in the field feel similarly, and that commercial goals should not be 
pursued at the expense of the social goals, or vice versa, but that there should be some 
accommodation between the two. However, this does not go to the point of the matter which is to 
clarify and quantify each goal in every case. As one indigenous organisation remarked to the 
Inquiry: ‘Social benefits should be regarded as a valid performance indicator’ (Daiwul Gidja 
Cultural Centre 1998: 14). A social goal such as creating employment, or improving a community 
airstrip, is potentially a commercial cost and as such it needs to be accounted for. Therefore, what 
is required is not the rejection of one goal for another but a system that clarifies and accounts for 
all goals whether they are commercial or social (see Arthur 1996: 16). 
Access issues 
The Inquiry’s terms of reference instruct the Committee to investigate any barriers to establishing 
indigenous businesses. These barriers are considered here as access issues and cover a number 
of areas. 
Access to capital 
A primary function of the Commonwealth Government’s business programs (currently from 
ATSIC, the TSRA and the CDC) is to provide loans or grants to people who want to establish a 
new business, purchase an existing business or enter a joint venture; that is to say, they are 
largely to provide access to business capital.17 Information provided by ATSIC to the Inquiry show 
that since the 1970s, ATSIC and its predecessors, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and the 
Aboriginal Development Commission have, through a variety of programs, approved almost 1,500 
business loans. These have had a median size of $32,000 and a total value of around $80 million 
(ATSIC 1998a: 196).18 Of these 1,500 loans, some 73 per cent have been completed or are being 
paid off and 27 per cent are inactive or have been written off (ATSIC 1998a: 196). 
A principal complaint to the Inquiry was that ATSIC is slow to respond to applications to its 
business programs (Karrayili Adult Education Centre 1998: 2; Miwatj Regional Council 1998: 2; 
Tasmanian Regional Council 1998; Tia Tucker Association 1998: 29; Tiwi Land Council 1998). In 
response, ATSIC indicated that it may take between two and six months to approve loans (ATSIC 
1998a: 61) while the TSRA stated that it takes six weeks (TSRA 1998a: 3). The TSRA’s shorter 
approval period may be due to the fact that a large percentage of its applications are for small 
loans for ventures in commercial fishing and, as has been noted above, these are fairly secure. 
Also, the TSRA has a comparatively small area and population to service and it actively solicits its 
clients.19 One reason ATSIC gave for taking several months to approve loans was that applicants 
do not always provide adequate information in the initial stages. Despite the delays, ATSIC 
approves 80 per cent of the loan applications it receives (ATSIC 1998a: 55). 
At hearings, the Committee expressed an interest in the possible advantages of people 
accessing smaller amounts of capital through micro-credit arrangements and referred to the 
Grameen Bank as a model (ATSIC 1998b: 9).20 The Committee received one submission from the 
Foundation for Development Corporation which proposed an evaluation of the concept of micro-
credit and another submission which described a proposal to set up a ‘First Nations’ indigenous 
credit union within the already established Credit Union Foundation of Australia (CUFA). The 
principle was that CUFA should initially act as an incubator, or mentor, for First Nations and the 
two bodies would separate when First Nations’ assets reached $20 million (Victorian Aboriginal 
Committee for Credit Union Development (VAC) 1998a, 1998b: 91). The Inquiry was also told of 
an indigenous credit union that was already operating: the Traditional Credit Union was formed 
by ALPA in 1995 in the Northern Territory, with assistance from ATSIC. The Union now has five 
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branches whose members represent between 50 and 90 per cent of the indigenous population at 
each branch location (ALPA 1998: 138). Loans are limited to a maximum of $5,000 and to this 
date all loans have been repaid successfully (ALPA 1998: 145). Interestingly, the assets appear to 
be organised and controlled on a clan basis (ALPA 1998: 145). This, and the fact that loans are in 
the order of $5,000, may make this system similar to that operating within the Grameen Bank 
where loans are small by Australian standards and are monitored by a peer group (see McDonnell 
1999). However, any application of the Grameen model, especially as it originated in Asia, would 
have to take account of such factors as the minimum income provided by the Australian welfare 
system and the willingness of Australian indigenous people to operate under peer pressure and 
control (ATSIC 1998b: 12). 
The foregoing comments apply principally to indigenous-specific systems for accessing 
capital. The Inquiry received no data that would indicate how many indigenous people attempted 
to access mainstream banks or other lending institutions and their levels of success, though in 
1998 it was revealed that some indigenous people find it hard to access mainstream lending 
institutions and banks and appear to be locked into accessing business capital only from ATSIC 
(Arthur 1998a). This would seem a suitable area for further research. On the other hand, some 
alternative sources of funds were revealed by the Inquiry. For example, indigenous people in 
Western Australia who want a business loan or grant can apply to the State Lotteries Commission 
which has an annual fund of $3 million (DCTWA 1998b: 327).21 
Equity, collateral and traditionally owned land 
Forms of land tenure can influence access to business (Altman 1995). This is particularly 
the case when the land is held collectively and/or is inalienable. For instance, the Inquiry heard 
that it is difficult for an individual, a family, or a non-indigenous person to access land on which 
to establish a business when the land is owned or under the control of a either a community or a 
group of traditional owners (CDC 1998a: 35). ALPA notes that this has made it impossible for 
individuals or outsiders to own community stores in the Northern Territory as these are normally 
located on land held under traditional land tenure (ALPA 1998: 146). Similarly, the CDC has 
found that collective land ownership has meant that joint ventures with non-indigenous 
companies have had to be with indigenous communities or organisations rather than with 
individuals or families (CDC 1998a: 36). 
Traditionally owned land is normally inalienable. One consequence of this is that it cannot 
be mortgaged, or used in any similar way, as security for business loans (CDC 1998b). For 
instance, a small-businessman in Torres Strait indicated to the Inquiry that he was unable to use 
community-owned land to raise capital for his cray fishing business (Taika 1998: 2). Also, outside 
companies are unlikely to enter into joint ventures on this type of land as they are unable to 
realise their share of the venture on the market at a later date (Altman 1995). 
Structures to facilitate business 
The Commonwealth Government has several structures in place which aim to assist 
indigenous people to enter business and to access land. The principal of these are ATSIC, the 
TSRA, the CDC and the ILC.22 Other elements of the process include business ‘agents’ contracted 
by ATSIC in each State whose functions include processing and assessing loan applications and 
helping to prepare business plans. These business ‘agents’ tend to be in either the private sector 
or in mainstream government departments. For example, until recently, the role of business 
‘agent’ in Western Australia was performed by the State’s Department of Commerce and Trade 
and in some other States ‘agents’ are private accounting companies (ATSIC 1998e: 353). 
Therefore, the system has several elements and crosses several sectors: indigenous-public, 
mainstream-public and the private sector. State bodies have also developed their own structures 
to increase indigenous access. For example, the Northern Territory Government has set up a 
Focus Group for Economic Development (Northern Territory Government 1998) and the Western 
Australian Government has established an Aboriginal Economic Development Council of 
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indigenous people. One feature of the Council in Western Australia is that it is a policy body but 
not a funding body (DCTWA 1998b: 321). This may allow it to be more objective than, for 
example, ATSIC’s regional councils which can be required to balance funding issues with local 
politics. 
As noted at the beginning of this paper, one Commonwealth Government plan is to hive-off 
the business or commercial sections of some of its agencies to form one new body called the IBA 
(see Herron 1998). The logic behind this appears to be rationalisation and simplification, and a 
desire to establish a body with a more purely commercial ethos. The Inquiry process elicited some 
qualified support for this idea (see ATSIC 1998a: 60; CDC 1998a: 32, 1998c). However, later in 
1998 and independent of the Inquiry, ATSIC produced its own response to the proposed IBA 
which did not support establishing a new body but suggested instead that access for indigenous 
people could be improved through its own restructuring. A key feature of this restructuring would 
be increased articulation between the indigenous and the private financial sectors (ATSIC 
1998f).23 While the ILC was not opposed to the concept of the IBA, it did not itself wish to be 
included in such a body, indicating that it would prefer to establish its own arm to deal with the 
commercial development of its land acquisitions (ILC 1998: 212). The TSRA suggested that since 
gaining some relative local autonomy from ATSIC in 1994 they have been able to modify the 
standard ATSIC programs to suit their maritime environment and so increase their commitment 
to economic development (TSRA 1998a: 2, 1998b: 132, 134).24 Consequently, the TSRA feel that 
they would be unwilling to be part of any new body if this meant losing their newly gained 
autonomy (TSRA 1998a: 2). Possibly this view is also influenced by the fact that an inquiry 
carried out by the Commonwealth Parliament in 1996–97, was quite supportive of further 
autonomy for Torres Strait Islanders (see Commonwealth of Australia 1997). 
Like the TSRA, the CDC also qualified its support for the IBA. But in this case the 
qualification reflected a concern about whether such a business or development agency should 
have a public or private persona. For example, the CDC believes that it is hindered from operating 
in a similar way to commercial organisations in the private sector by the fact that it is a public 
statutory body staffed by public servants; it feels therefore that any new body and its staff should 
be outside the public service (CDC 1998a: 33, 1998c). To an extent, this is an approach followed 
by the Western Australian Department of Commerce and Trade who ensure that applications for 
loans and any forms of business assessment are carried out by agents in the private sector, not 
by public servants (DCTWA 1998a: 258).25 Similarly, this Department suggests that a body like 
the IBA should be the responsibility of a relevant mainstream agency such as the Department of 
Industry Science and Tourism rather than be set up as a purely indigenous agency. No doubt 
DCTWA takes this approach because it is itself a mainstream agency which houses the Office of 
Aboriginal Economic Development reflecting the Western Australian Government’s tendency 
towards mainstreaming and its belief that access is improved when all citizens are treated in the 
same way (DCTWA 1998a: 245). 
However, research has suggested that access to mainstream services may be affected by 
some misconceptions about the relationship between indigenous-specific and mainstream policies 
and programs (Arthur 1998a). For example, some Torres Strait Islanders on the Australian 
mainland surveyed in 1997 indicated that they think ATSIC is the appropriate and primary 
provider of programs and services for them, and so they do not attempt to access any mainstream 
programs or services.26 In other cases, when they do approach ATSIC they claim it is unable to 
provide them with information about alternative programs or service providers, say, in 
mainstream departments. On the other hand, mainstream service providers may reject Islander 
applicants. For example, Islanders who have approached banks for loans say they have been 
referred back to ATSIC as their appropriate lending body (Arthur 1998a). There is however, also 
evidence of a more positive relationship between the public and private sectors and between the 
indigenous and the mainstream sectors. Evidence to the Inquiry from Western Australia 
suggested that some indigenous people in their 40s and 50s, choose to move out of employment 
in the public sector and to apply the skills they have gained there to operate private businesses 
(DCTWA 1998a: 253). A similar relationship can be seen between the public sector and the non-
government sector. For instance, indigenous people may utilise the skills they gain in the public 
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service to work in indigenous non-government organisations (DCTWA 1998a: 251). Although 
these organisations are not strictly commercial businesses, they often have a commercial arm and 
function like a hybrid of non-government organisations and not-for-profit businesses (Altman et 
al. 1998; Arthur 1998b). 
These observations remind us that one reason that some indigenous people establish 
businesses may be because they are reluctant to interact at a one-to-one or face-to-face level with 
non-indigenous people, and that having their own business can allow them to work with people 
with similar cultural values and outlook (Altman 1988). Examples of this have been noted in the 
cattle industry where indigenous people may favour doing work for non-indigenous stations as a 
team of contractors (Arthur 1990b: 138). In these cases, it is only the contract boss who need 
interact with the non-indigenous station owner. However, all parties can benefit from such 
arrangements. For example, when discussing indigenous employment with the Inquiry, the 
mining company Nabalco stated: 
It is a question of cultural background. If their cultural ethic requires them to participate in 
ceremonies, it is very difficult for us to make allowances for that in this plant. That is why we 
see the Yirrkala Business Enterprise (YBE) as our means of employing Aboriginal people, 
because YBE has a better capacity to handle the cultural side of the requirements. We give YBE 
a specific job and they do it within that specific job framework. They can be quite flexible in 
their employment. We do not have the capacity to be so flexible (Nabalco 1998: 4). 
Summary and possible further research 
As explained at the outset, the 1997 Commonwealth parliamentary Inquiry into Indigenous 
Business was terminated before it was completed and this paper is an attempt to summarise 
some of the evidence given to the Inquiry to see if this increases our understanding of indigenous 
businesses. The evidence provides additional information on issues about which we are already 
aware. For example, there appears to be a continuing desire to clarify social and commercial goals 
within indigenous businesses. There is also some interest in establishing businesses that are 
owned by individuals and families rather than just communities, and in the strategy of joint 
venturing. A number of access issues were also raised during the Inquiry such as the ability to 
raise capital from inalienable land and some of the limits of the existing government structures. 
However, most of the data supplied to the Inquiry were from bureaucracies and much of it 
related to their programs rather than to the enterprises themselves. Very few submissions were 
from indigenous people in business and the data tell us almost nothing about such issues as 
their aims, their problems, or the size of their ventures (the number of employees or turnover). 
Despite the fact that other data indicate that the majority of self-employed indigenous people are 
in major urban centres (capital cities), the Inquiry collected no data from these areas. Also absent 
from the Inquiry were submissions from any of the mainstream banks. Therefore, the majority of 
the evidence to the Inquiry does not add a great deal to our knowledge about the nature of 
indigenous businesses nor does it introduce many new issues or insights. However, evidence to 
the Inquiry did raise the possibility of increasing access for indigenous people through micro-
credit and credit union arrangements and one submission proposed that aspiring business people 
could be mentored through the facility of business incubators (Canberra Business Centres 1998a, 
1998b, 1998c: 238). These proposals may warrant further investigation (see McDonnell 1999). 
The Inquiry has revealed that other data may be available that have not yet been analysed. 
For example, the DCTWA has indicated that it has records on some 1,000 indigenous businesses. 
Both this Department and ATSIC have suggested that some of the business people with whom 
they have contact may be willing to be interviewed (ATSIC 1998c: 26). If we acknowledge that 
better information about indigenous businesses will lead to more appropriate and effective 
policies, it would seem worthwhile exploring these new data sources in the future. 
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Notes 
1. The CDC is a statutory body established under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
Act 1989. The CDC encourages indigenous people into medium- and large-scale businesses, 
principally through the strategy of joint ventures (see Arthur 1996). 
2. The TSRA is a statutory body established under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
Amendment Act 1993. The Authority was created to increase regional autonomy and its enabling 
legislation gives it similar powers to those of ATSIC itself. 
3. The Department defines an indigenous business as one which has 50 per cent or more indigenous 
ownership, is self-sustainable or is planning to this end and is operating 20 or more hours per week 
(NSWDSRD 1998: 4). 
4. A further caveat is the relatively high proportion of not stateds in the census data. 
5. At its hearing, the TSRA told the Inquiry that 95 per cent of the requests for funding that they receive 
are for commercial fishing ventures (TSRA 1998a: 3). 
6. In the CDEP scheme, indigenous people engage in work, usually for their community, in return for 
their welfare unemployment entitlements. 
7. ALPA is a non-government organisation whose major function is operating community stores. 
8. In other cases, the community store may have an effective monopoly in a community, which may deter 
individual or family entrepreneurs. For example, a Queensland Government trading company, the 
Island Board of Industry Service, effectively competes with indigenous storekeepers in Torres Strait 
(Arthur 1990a; CDC 1998a: 36). 
9. ATSIC noted 16 businesses that it considered successful, and the former Department of Employment, 
Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA) noted 35 (ATSIC 1998a: 201ff; DEETYA 1998: 38, 
39). Neither agency gave any indication of how success was defined, and too little information was 
provided to suggest the factors that had led to success.  
10. In Torres Strait, fishing loans represent 25 per cent of the total economic development budget of the 
TSRA. The average loan to the fishing industry is $10,000 (TSRA 1998b) which is approximately the 
amount required to purchase the gear to engage in commercial (cray) fishing (see Arthur 1990a, 1991). 
11. Other ATSIC data provided to the Inquiry suggest that individuals are more likely to be applying for 
loans to establish businesses in the agriculture and building industries, while communities are more 
likely to be entering manufacturing (ATSIC 1998d: 256). 
12. The TSRA has already helped establish a joint venture between two islands to process frozen cray fish 
(TSRA 1998b: 136). The Tiwi Land Council also stated in its submission that it is attempting to 
establish a joint venture but too few details were provided to say what form this might take (Tiwi Land 
Council 1998). 
13. ALPA suggested that indigenous check-out workers in community stores come under similar 
pressures from community customers (ALPA 1998: 147).  
14. The ILC is a statutory body established under the Land Fund and Indigenous Land Corporation (ATSIC 
Amendment) Act 1995 to assist indigenous people acquire and manage land. 
15. For a fuller discussion of this issue see Arthur (1996), Altman (1998), Herron (1998), and Pritchard 
(1998). 
16. ALPA gave examples of two such projects, which involved an expenditure of $62,000 on community 
airstrips (ALPA 1998: 142). 
17. For further details of ATSIC loans and programs see McDonnell (1999). 
18. This does not represent the total Commonwealth expenditure on indigenous businesses in this period, 
as it does not include business grants. Grant data for the same period was not provided to the Inquiry.  
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19. The TSRA has approached 75 per cent of all of its loan recipients (TSRA 1998b: 137).  
20. This model is more fully discussed in McDonnell (1999). 
21. Indigenous resource agencies in Western Australia commonly apply to the Lotteries Commission for 
funds (Arthur 1998b). 
22. This refers to the business sections of these agencies. ATSIC, TSRA and ILC also perform other 
functions. State and Territory governments also have strategies for indigenous economic development 
but little hard data were given to the Inquiry about these. 
23. The overall features of ATSIC’s proposal are: 
(a) ATSIC tendering and negotiating with financial institutions for the delivery of its business and, 
possibly housing loan programs. 
(b) ATSIC and other indigenous bodies tendering collectively for investment management services, 
including through the establishment of an indigenous investment fund in which indigenous and 
non-indigenous bodies could invest. 
(c) ATSIC and other indigenous bodies tendering for general banking services (ATSIC 1998f: 4). 
24. An increase from $12,150 per annum to around $2 million per annum (TSRA 1998a: 2, 1998b: 132, 
134). 
25. An additional assessment strategy adopted by Western Australia is to focus on the purchase of 
existing business as these have proven financial histories and records (DCTWA 1998a: 256). 
26. It must be added that Torres Strait Islanders are also aware of other reasons for accessing ATSIC, 
such as its concessional loans and grants. 
Appendix A 
Written submissions to the Inquiry and associated hearings 
1. Dr Brian Noad, Sydney, New South Wales. 
2. Ngaanyatjarra Council, Alice Springs, Northern Territory. 
3. Southern Cross University, Lismore, New South Wales. 
4. Dreamtime Cultural Centre, Rockhampton, Queensland. 
5. Department of Families, Youth and Community Care, Queensland. 
6. Minister for Housing, Aboriginal Affairs, and Water Resources, Western Australia. 
7. Murray Island Community Council, Torres Strait, Queensland. 
8. Tia Tucker Association, Ceduna, South Australia. 
9. Mr Darren Miller, Yarrabah, Queensland. 
10. The Foundation for Development Corporation Ltd, Brisbane, Queensland. 
11. Bidgerdii Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Corporation Community Health Service 
Central Queensland Region, Rockhampton, Queensland. 
12. Innovative Financial Management, Darwin, Northern Territory. 
13. Ms Pat Buchanan, Kununurra, Western Australia. 
14. Mr Steve Bowditch, Sydney, New South Wales. 
15. Confidential (supplementary submission). 
16. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commercial Development Corporation, Australian 
Capital Territory [Hearings 11 March and 1 April 1998]. 
17. Indigenous Land Corporation [Hearing 27 May 1998]. 
18. Confidential. 
19. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Tasmanian State Office, Hobart, 
Tasmania. 
12 ARTHUR 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
20. Torres Strait Regional Authority, Torres Strait, Queensland [Hearing 19 May 1998]. 
21. Northern Territory Government, Darwin, Northern Territory. 
22. Australia Council, Sydney, New South Wales. 
23. Henry Walker Group Ltd, Adelaide, South Australia. 
24. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Australian Capital Territory [Hearings 11 
and 25 March 1998]. 
25. Industry Science and Tourism, Australian Capital Territory. 
26. Rio Tinto Ltd. [Hearing 13 May 1998]. 
27. Department of Premier and Cabinet, Brisbane, Queensland (not sighted). 
28. Department of Premier and Cabinet, Brisbane, Queensland (supplementary submission). 
29. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Australian Capital Territory 
(supplementary submission). 
30. Confidential. 
31. Victorian Aboriginal Committee for Credit Union Development, Credit Care Project, 
Advantage Credit Union, Perth, Western Australia [Hearing 25 March 1998]. 
32. Canberra Business Centres, Australian Capital Territory [Hearing 27 May 1998]. 
33. Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Australian Capital Territory [Hearing 13 
May 1998]. 
34. Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Australian Capital Territory. 
35. Department of Commerce and Trade, Government of Western Australia, Perth, Western 
Australia [Hearing 3 June 1998]. 
36. Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, Australian Capital 
Territory. 
37. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Development Commission, Australian Capital Territory 
(supplementary submission). 
38. Confidential (supplementary submission). 
39. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Australian Capital Territory 
(supplementary submission). 
40. Mr Jim Stuart. 
41. Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, Australian Capital 
Territory (supplementary submission) [Hearings 1 and 8 April 1998]. 
42. The Tiwi Land Council, Winnellie, Northern Territory. 
43. Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Australian Capital Territory 
(supplementary submission). 
44. Canberra Business Centres, Australian Capital Territory (supplementary submissions). 
45. Mr Barry Louvel, Broome, Western Australia. 
46. Indigenous Land Corporation. 
47. Indigenous Land Corporation (not sighted). 
48. South Australian Government (not sighted). 
Hearings held without receiving written submissions 
1. Marngarr Community, Nhulunbuy, Northern Territory, 21 April 1998. 
2. Miwatj Regional Council, Nhulunbuy, Northern Territory, 21 April 1998. 
3. Nabalco, Nhulunbuy, Northern Territory, 22 April 1998. 
4. Yirrkala Business Enterprises, Nhulunbuy, Northern Territory, 22 April 1998. 
5. Yirrkala Dhanbul Council, Nhulunbuy, Northern Territory, 22 April 1998. 
6. Arnhem Land Progress Association, Darwin, Northern Territory, 23 April 1998. 
7. Innovative Financial Management, Darwin, Northern Territory, 23 April 1998. 
8. Sylvatech, Darwin, Northern Territory, 23 April 1998. 
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9. Karrayili Adult Education Centre, Fitzroy Crossing, Western Australia, 5 May 1998. 
10. Leedal Pty Ltd, Fitzroy Crossing, Western Australia, 5 May 1998. 
11. Argyle Diamond Mine, Argyle, Western Australia, 5 May 1998. 
12. Daiwul Gidja Cultural Centre, Turkey Creek, Western Australia, 5 May 1998. 
13. Daniel Takai, Torres Strait, Queensland, 19 May 1998. 
14. William Bowie, Torres Strait, Queensland, 20 May 1998. 
15. Kubin Island Council, Torres Strait, Queensland, 20 May 1998. 
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1 The CDC is a statutory body established under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission Act 1989. The CDC encourages indigenous people into medium and large-scale 
businesses, principally through the strategy of joint ventures (see Arthur 1996).  
2 The TSRA is a statutory body established under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission Amendment Act 1993. The Authority was created to increase regional autonomy and 
its enabling legislation gives it similar powers to those of ATSIC itself. 
3 The Department defines an indigenous business as one which has 50 per cent or more 
indigenous ownership; is self-sustainable or is planning to this end and is operating 20 or more 
hours per week (NSWDSRD 1998: 4). 
4 A further caveat is the relatively high proportion of not stateds in the census data. 
5 At its hearing, the TSRA told the Inquiry that 95 per cent of the requests for funding that they 
receive are for commercial fishing ventures (TSRA 1998a: 3). 
6 In the CDEP scheme, indigenous people engage in work, usually for their community, in return 
for their welfare unemployment entitlements. 
7 ALPA is a non-government organisation whose major function is operating community stores. 
8 In other cases, the community store may have an effective monopoly in a community, which 
may deter individual or family entrepreneurs. For example, a Queensland Government trading 
company, the Island Board of Industry Service, effectively competes with indigenous 
storekeepers (Arthur 1990a; CDC 1998a: 36). 
9 ATSIC noted 16 businesses that it considered successful, and the former Department of 
Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA) noted 35 (ATSIC 1998a: 201ff; 
DEETYA 1998: 38, 39). Neither agency gave any indication of how success was defined, and too 
little information was provided to suggest the factors that had led to success.  
10 In Torres Strait, fishing loans represent 25 per cent of the total economic development budget 
of the TSRA. The average loan to the fishing industry is $10,000 (TSRA 1998b) which is 
approximately the amount required to purchase the gear to engage in commercial (cray) fishing 
(see Arthur 1990a; 1991). 
11 Other ATSIC data provided to the Inquiry suggest that individuals are more likely to be 
applying for loans to establish businesses in the agriculture and building industries, and 
communities are more likely to be entering manufacturing (ATSIC 1998d: 256). 
12 The TSRA has already helped establish a joint venture between two islands to process frozen 
cray fish (TSRA 1998b: 136). The Tiwi Land Council also stated in its submission that it is 
attempting to establish a joint venture but too few details were provided to say what form this 
might take (Tiwi Land Council 1998). 
13 ALPA suggested that indigenous check-out workers in community stores come under similar 
pressures from community customers (ALPA 1998: 147).  
14 The ILC is a statutory body established under the Land Fund and Indigenous Land Corporation 
(ATSIC Amendment) Act 1995 to assist indigenous people acquire and manage land. 
15 For a fuller discussion of this issue see Arthur (1996); Herron (1998); Altman (1998); Pritchard 
(1998). 
16 ALPA gave examples of two such projects, which totalled an expenditure of $62,000 on 
community airstrips (ALPA 1998: 142). 
17 For further details of ATSIC loans and programs see McDonnell (1999). 
18 This does not represent the total Commonwealth expenditure on indigenous businesses in this 
period, as it does not include business grants. Grant data for the same period was not provided 
to the Inquiry.  
19 The TSRA has approached 75 per cent of all of its loan recipients (TSRA 1998b: 137).  
20 This model is more fully discussed in McDonnell (1999). 
21 Indigenous resource agencies in Western Australia commonly apply to the Lotteries 
Commission for funds (Arthur 1998b). 
22 This refers to the business sections of these agencies. ATSIC, TSRA and ILC also perform other 
functions. State and Territory governments also have strategies for indigenous economic 
development but little hard data were given to the Inquiry about these. 
23 The overall features of ATSIC’s proposal are: 
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a) ATSIC tendering and negotiating with financial institutions for the delivery of its business 
and, possibly housing loan programs. 
b) ATSIC and other indigenous bodies tendering collectively for investment management 
services, including through the establishment of an indigenous investment fund in which 
indigenous and non-indigenous bodies could invest. 
c) ATSIC and other indigenous bodies tendering for general banking services (ATSIC 1998f: 4). 
24From $12,150 per annum to around $2 million per annum (TSRA 1998a:2; 1998b: 132, 134). 
25 An additional assessment strategy adopted by Western Australia is to focus on the purchase of 
existing business as these have proven financial histories and records (DCTWA 1998a: 256). 
26 It must be added that Torres Strait Islanders are also aware of other reasons for accessing 
ATSIC, such as its concessional loans and grants. 
